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in order to clarify the situation for future legislative action, holds
in effect that if the assessment had been authorized, the statute
would not be valid retroactively 15 because such a statute would
by way of amendment materially increase the liability of the stockholder -in other words, deprive him of his property without due
process of law. The case, therefore, forcibly illustrates the contention that the only real and valid limitation on the state's right
to amend or repeal corporate charters is the due process clause of
the federal constitution.
F. W. L.
EQUITY -

SEQUESTRATION

OF

PERSONAL

PROPERTY

PENDING

FINAL LITIGATION TO DETERMNE OWNERSHIP.- Suit instituted by
X and other heirs of Y against A, administratrix and widow of Y,
and B company, her surety. The bill alleges that Y owned Liberty
bonds at his death, about which time they came into the hands of
A, and prays that A be required to account for the bonds and restrained from disposing of them. A answered, alleging that bonds
were in her possession claiming them as a gift from Y and disclosing the details of the transfer. B company then gave notice of
a motion to require A to turn the bonds over to some person, whom
the court should name, to be held by him until ownership be determined. On return day of the notice B filed its answer, which
alleges that if the bonds be found to be a part of Y's estate, there
is "grave danger" that B would be liable for the bonds, especially
if A has disposed of the bonds and is unable to make an accounting,
for A is without assets from which a recovery could be had. The
verified answer then prayed that the court sequester the bonds.
Without further showing, the trial court granted the motion. Held,
one judge dissenting, that the trial court was in error in granting
an order of sequestration upon the grounds shown. Vangilder v.
Vangilder; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 1angilder.'
Formerly, sequestration had its chief importance as a chancery
remedy whereby the property of a person, or of a corporation, was
seized by officers of the court of chancery to punish contempts or
to compel obedience to the order or decree of the court, final or
interlocutory. The modern importance of the sequestration pro15 Note that the similar statute affecting ordinary corporations expressly
negatives retroactive effect. W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1,

§ 3.

1193 S. E. 342 (W. Va. 1938).
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cess in the United States consists almost entirely in its use as a conservatory writ to preserve, pending litigation, specific property
2
subject to conflicting claims of ownership, liens, or privileges..
Despite its narrow and infrequent use, however, courts of equity
have inherent power in cases where there is no adequate legal
remedy, to issue the writ and impound the property in controversy,
pending determination of the rights thereto.3 Sequestration is an
ia ren proceeding drawing the property into the custody and control of the court, and binding the property, though there may not
be jurisdiction of all the persons having rights or interests in it.4
However, courts of equity are reluctant to use the writ too readily,
and justly so, for it has been proven that the effects of the writ
are the most calamitous and oppressive of any known in the law.'
A survey of the cases on the subject will readily show that
the grounds upon which this extraordinary remedy is granted
must leave little room for doubt in the court's mind as to the defendant's motives. It has been held that the affidavit upon which
the writ of sequestration is founded must state positively the
existence of the facts upon which the application is grounded, or
if only a matter of belief, the grounds of the belief, that the court
may judge whether it is a rational and well founded belief." In
accord is the proposition set forth by the North Carolina court
that mere apprehension that one in possession of property pending
litigation will dispose of it is not ground for the writ. pacts and
circumstances of a convincing nature must be alleged and proved
showing reasonable grounds for the apprehension.' It would
seem then that the prayer in this case was clearly insufficient, for
it stated as grounds for the relief sought a mere apprehension that
the defendant would dispose of the bonds without allegation of
any reasonable ground for the belief. There is also another
ground to support the holding of the court, although it is not
readily apparent. It is the policy of the court to require, when the
2 The writ of sequestration has been largely replaced in its original purpose
by statutes allowing execution on money decrees. See W. VA. REV. CODE
(Michie, 1937) c. 38, art. 3, § 12.
3 Grantham v. Lucas, 15 W. Va. 425 (1879); Claflin Co. v. De Vaughn, 106
Ga. 282, 32 S. E. 108 (1898); Perkins v. Dickinson, 3 Gratt. 320 (Va. 1846).
4 Steele v. Walker, 115 Ala. 485, 21 So. 942, 67 Am. St. Rep. 62 (1896) ; Lee
v. Lee, 135 Miss. 865, 101 So. 345 (1924).
GAs to the harshness of the writ a full discussion of the hardship to the
defendant attending it is to be found in the case of Hook v. Ross, 1 Hen. & My.

310 (Va. 1807).

@Edwards v. Massey, 8 N. C. 360 (1821).
7Mercer v. Byrd, 57 N. C. 358, 360 (1859).
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extraordinary remedy of sequestration is asked on the basis of legal
title, that the plaintiff must come forward with fairness and set
out a title, which, prima facie, is a good one." The court here apparently was not satisfied that the bill brought by X and the other
heirs, in view -of A's answer, set up that prima facie case, hence
it followed a sound rule in refusing the harsh decree sought. However, it must be stated that since sequestration is a conservative
process, error in issuing the writ does not prejudice the hearing on
the merits in the main case. 9
It is submitted, that the court in refusing to uphold the decree issued by the trial court followed the dictates of a sounder
policy and reached a proper and just decision.
H. G. W.
PROCEDURE-DEIURRER

TO MISJOINDER Or PARTnES UNDER

THE REVISED CODE. -A bond was executed by Doddridge County
Bank, as principal, and other defendants as sureties, to secure deposits of the plaintiff. On an action on this bond the defendants
moved to dismiss the case because of misjoinder of parties plaintiff. Held, that this procedure was irregular, since under the West
Virginia statute' all challenges of the sufficiency of pleadings
2
should be by demurrer. Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank.
Prior to the 1931 Revised Code of West Virginia it was
definitely established that a demurrer was the correct procedure
for raising an objection to misjoinder of parties.3 The new statute,
however, indicates that such a method is no longer proper.4 Under
the Virginia code provision' which served as a model for the West
Virginia statute it has been held consistently that the only method
s Griffin v. Carter, 40 N. C. 413 (1848); Parker v. Grammer, 62 N. C. 28
(1866).
9 See Note (1900) 49 L. R. A. 773; Ross v. Colville, 3 Call 382 (Va. 1803).
1W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 36.
2 194 S. E. 79 (W. Va. 1937).
3 Stewart v. Tams, 108 W. Va. 539, 151 S. E. 849 (1930); Fidelity, oe.
Co. v. Shaid, 103 W. Va. 432, 137 S. E. 878 (1927); Lambert v. County Court,
103 W. Va. 37, 136 S. E. 507 (1927) ; Hunt v. Mounts, 101 N. Va. 205, 133
S. E. 323 (1926). And see Jones and Carlin, Nonjoinder and 3Misjoinder of
Parties in Gomnmon Law Actions (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 197, 266; Comment
(1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 373.
action . . . shall abate or be defeated by the misjoinder or non4 "No
joinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant. Whenever such misjoinder shall be
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the parties misjoined shall be dropped
by order of the court, entered of its own accord or upon motion, at any stage
of the cause." W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 34.
5 VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) § 6102.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938

3

